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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Faron Raymond Hawkins appeals from the judgment entered upon the district 
court’s order summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief.  On appeal he 
argues the district court erred by denying appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw and by 
not ruling on counsel’s renewed motions to withdraw.  He also argues the court erred by 
summarily dismissing his petition without taking judicial notice of the underlying 
criminal proceedings. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 In 2008, a jury found Hawkins guilty of two counts of robbery.  State v. Hawkins, 
159 Idaho 507, 509, 363 P.3d 348, 350 (2015).  The district court entered a judgment of 
conviction and imposed concurrent unified sentences of life, with 30 years fixed.  State v. 
Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774, 777, 229 P.3d 379, 382 (Ct. App. 2009).  On appeal from his 
convictions, Hawkins argued the district court erred by not sua sponte ordering a 
competency evaluation.  Id.  The Court of Appeals agreed and vacated the judgment and 
remanded for a determination of Hawkins’ competency.  Id. at 777-783, 229 P.3d at 382-
388. 
On remand, the district court conducted the required competency proceedings and 
found that Hawkins was competent, both at the time of the competency proceedings and 
when he stood trial in January 2008.  State v. Hawkins, 155 Idaho 69, 70-71, 305 P.3d 
513, 514-515 (2013).  However, because the concluding paragraph of the Court of 
Appeals’ opinion stated it was “not possible to retroactively make a determination as to 
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Hawkins’ competency at the time he was tried,” the district court concluded it was bound 
by “law of the case” to conduct a new trial.  Id. at 71, 305 P.3d at 515.  The Idaho 
Supreme Court granted the state’s request for leave to file a permissive appeal as to this 
latter determination, id., and ultimately held that “[n]either the law of the case doctrine 
nor I.A.R. 38 prevents the district court from making a retroactive competency 
determination as to Hawkins in this case,” id. at 75, 305 P.3d at 519. 
On remand following the Idaho Supreme Court’s opinion, and following 
additional proceedings intended to ensure Hawkins’ competency, the district court 
reinstated the judgment and the concurrent unified sentences of life, with 30 years fixed.  
State v. Hawkins, 159 Idaho 507, 509-512, 363 P.3d 348, 350-353 (2015).  The Idaho 
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and sentences.  Id. at 512-517, 363 P.3d at 353-
358.  
 On February 13, 2015, Hawkins filed a timely1 pro se petition for post-conviction 
relief (R., pp.6-75) and a motion for the appointment of counsel (R., pp.76-78).  The 
district court appointed the Ada County Public Defender’s Office to represent Hawkins in 
the post-conviction proceedings (R., pp.92-93) and, on March 20, 2015, Attorney Joseph 
Ellsworth appeared as conflict counsel (R., pp.113-14).   
On September 28, 2015, Mr. Ellsworth filed a motion for leave to withdraw as 
counsel of record, asserting as the bases for his motion that Hawkins had “expressed 
dissatisfaction” with Mr. Ellsworth’s representation and “desire[d] that counsel no longer
                                            
1 Below, the state initially took the position that the petition was not timely and it moved 
for dismissal on that basis.  (R., pp.80-85.)  The state later recognized the petition was in 
fact timely and therefore withdrew the motion to dismiss.  (R., pp.89-91.) 
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represent” him, and that counsel was “preclude[d]” by a “lack of cooperation from” 
Hawkins from “adequately representing” Hawkins any further.  (R., pp.129-31.)  No 
further action was taken on the motion until January 2016, when Mr. Ellsworth noticed it 
for hearing.  (R., pp.133-34.)  At the hearing that followed on February 17, 2016, 
Mr. Ellsworth reiterated his request to withdraw and the reasons therefor, including that 
Hawkins had repeatedly expressed to Mr. Ellsworth that he was “not to do anything 
further on [Hawkins’] behalf,” that Hawkins did “not wish to utilize the services of court 
appointed counsel in the matter,” and that Mr. Ellsworth was “not authorized to … take 
any further action or steps on [Hawkins’] behalf.”  (Tr., p.5, L.22 – p.7, L.15.)  Primarily 
citing what he perceived to be failures by Mr. Ellsworth to communicate with him and to 
file documents on his behalf, Hawkins also personally requested that Mr. Ellsworth be 
allowed to withdraw and that another attorney be appointed or, alternatively, that he be 
permitted to represent himself.  (Tr., p.15, L.2 – p.18, L.13, p.19, L.22 – p.23, L.4.)  The 
district court denied the motion to withdraw, reasoning that Hawkins had no 
constitutional right to self-representation and that his case was complex, his pro se 
petition was “incoherent,” and he would benefit from the assistance of counsel and the 
filing of an amended petition.  (Tr., p.7, L.18 – p.9, L.12, p.10, L.21 – p.12, L.23, p.13, 
L.24 – p.14, L.12, p.18, L.14 – p.19, L.18, p.21, L.3 – p.22, L.8, p.23, Ls.5-21.)  The 
court also denied Hawkins’ request for substitute counsel, explaining: 
Well, if counsel reviews his records and determines that there is some kind 
of conflict, I think counsel is experienced and he will know what to do.  
But I’m not – no one has a right when it’s appointed counsel to have a 
particular appointed counsel.  It doesn’t work that way. 
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(Tr., p.21, Ls.15-23.)  The court indicated it may revisit the issue at some later date but 
stated it “would like to see if things can’t get worked out.”  (Tr., p.22, Ls.1-8, p.23, Ls.5-
21.)  The court therefore continued Mr. Ellsworth’s appointment as counsel and gave him 
90 days to file an amended petition.  (Tr., p.13, L.22 – p.14, L.12, p.23, Ls.16-20; R., 
p.135.) 
 On March 11, 2016, Mr. Ellsworth filed a “Notice of Lodging of Pleadings of 
Faron Hawkins and Renewed Motion to Withdraw.”  (R., pp.140-42 (notice and motion) 
143-225 (attachments)), as well as a “Motion to Rescind” an April 1, 2015, order which 
had prohibited Hawkins from filing any pro se pleadings (R., pp.226-28).  Between 
March and June 2016, Mr. Ellsworth filed three more notices of lodging of Hawkins’ pro 
se pleadings.  (See R., pp.229-327, 367-404, 404-545.)  He also filed an “Affidavit of 
Counsel in Support of Renewed Motion to Withdraw” (R., pp.365-66), but he never 
noticed the renewed motion to withdraw for hearing (see generally R.).  
In April 2016, the state answered Hawkins’ original pro se petition and moved for 
summary disposition.  (R., pp.328-64.)  The state also requested in its motion for 
summary disposition that the court take judicial notice of certain parts of the record of the 
underlying criminal proceeding.  (R., p.330.) 
On June 1, 2016, Mr. Ellsworth filed a “Supplemental Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief,”2 setting forth three new claims and “demand[ing] an evidentiary 
hearing on all claims now on file in the original and supplemental petitions.”  (R., pp.546-
51 (supplemental petition), 552-609 (attachments).)  The state did not respond to the
                                            
2 The supplemental petition was neither signed by Hawkins nor verified as required by 
I.C. § 18-4902(a). 
 5 
supplemental petition.  (See generally R.).  However, on October 19, 2016, the district 
court issued a “Notice of Intent to Dismiss,” ruling that Hawkins failed to make a prima 
facie showing that he was entitled to relief as to any of the claims in his original or 
supplemental petitions.  (R., pp.610-38.) 
After the court gave notice of its intent to dismiss, Mr. Ellsworth filed “Another 
Motion to Withdraw.”  (R., pp.639-40.)  Mr. Ellsworth stated in the motion that he 
requested a hearing “on the matter” (R., p.639), but he never filed a notice of hearing with 
the court (see generally R.).   
On November 22, 2016, Mr. Ellsworth filed an “Objection to Court’s Notice of 
Intent to Dismiss” (R., pp.645-46) and a memorandum in support thereof (R., pp.647-56).  
Concluding the objection “simply rehashe[d]” Hawkins’ previous arguments and “failed 
to address the deficiencies in his application,” the district court entered an order and a 
judgment dismissing Hawkins’ post-conviction petition in its entirety.  (R., pp.657-659.)  





Hawkins states the issues on appeal as: 
 
I. 
Whether the district court erred by denying the motion to withdraw as 
counsel and then by failing to rule on or even hold a hearing on appointed 
counsel’s repeated motions to withdraw[.] 
 
II. 
Whether the court erred when it failed to take judicial notice of the 
underlying criminal case so there was actually no record upon which the 
court could base its dismissal[.] 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.12.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Has Hawkins failed to show the district court erred, either by denying appointed 
counsel’s original motion to withdraw, or by not ruling on counsel’s renewed 
motions to withdraw, none of which were accompanied by a notice of hearing? 
 
2. Has Hawkins failed to show the district court committed reversible error by not 





Hawkins Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred, Either By Denying Appointed 
Counsel’s Original Motion To Withdraw, Or By Not Ruling On Counsel’s Renewed 
Motions To Withdraw That Were Never Noticed For Hearing 
 
A. Introduction 
 Hawkins argues the district court erred, both by denying appointed counsel’s 
original motion to withdraw (Appellant’s brief, pp.13-15), and by “refus[ing] to ever 
consider the subsequent requests to withdraw or to even hold a hearing” (id., pp.15-16).  
This Court should decline to consider Hawkins’ challenge to the denial of appointed 
counsel’s original motion to withdraw because Hawkins’ argument on this issue is 
unsupported by citation to even a single legal authority.  Alternatively, the argument fails 
because application of the correct legal standards shows the district court properly 
exercised its discretion in denying appointed counsel’s original motion to withdraw.  
Hawkins’ claim that the district court erred by not holding a hearing and ruling on 
counsel’s renewed motions to withdraw is likewise without merit because counsel never 
noticed the motions for hearing and, contrary to Hawkins’ assertions, the court had no 
duty to sua sponte hold a hearing to inquire into any alleged conflict between Hawkins 
and appointed counsel.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
The decision whether to permit an attorney to withdraw is reviewed for an abuse 
of discretion.  State v. Araiza, 124 Idaho 82, 90, 856 P.2d 872, 880 (1993).  See also 
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I.R.C.P. 11(b)(2) (2015)3 (“Leave to withdraw as a counsel of record may be granted by 
the court for good cause and upon such conditions or sanctions as will prevent any delay 
in determination and disposition of the pending action and the rights of the parties.” 
(emphasis added)); cf. State v. Lippert, 152 Idaho 884, 887, 276 P.3d 756, 759 (Ct. App. 
1994) (decision whether to appoint substitute counsel reviewed for abuse of discretion).  
“When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court 
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the 
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason.”  State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). 
C. Hawkins’ Claim That The District Court Erred In Denying Appointed Counsel’s 
Original Motion To Withdraw Is Waived And, Alternatively, Fails On The Merits 
 
1. Hawkins’ Argument Is Waived 
 
It is well-settled that Idaho’s appellate courts “will not consider assignments of 
error not supported by argument and authority in the opening brief.”  Cummings v. 
Stephens, 160 Idaho 847, 853, 380 P.3d 168, 174 (2016) (citation and internal quotations 
omitted).  “A party waives an issue on appeal  if either authority or argument is lacking, 
not just if both are lacking.”  State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 94, 967 P.2d 702, 708 (1998) 
(quoting State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996)); see also 
                                            
3 Effective July 1, 2016, I.R.C.P. 11(b) was amended and renumbered as I.R.C.P. 11.3. 
Because appointed counsel filed his original motion to withdraw in September 2015, the 
2016 amendments have no bearing on the correctness of the district court’s decision to 
deny that motion. 
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Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 168, 321 P.3d 709, 718 (2014) (holding appellant waived 
issue because he failed to “provide[] a single authority or legal proposition to support his 
argument”).  Additionally, where, as here, the applicable standard of review requires the 
appellate court to consider whether the lower court abused its discretion, the burden of 
showing an abuse of discretion “rests with the appellant.”  Cummings, 160 Idaho at 853, 
380 P.3d at 174.  A conclusory argument that “does not identify the applicable standard 
of review, much less attempt to apply it” is “fatally deficient” to the appellant’s case.  Id.; 
accord State v. Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569, 575 n.2, 388 P.3d 583, 589 n.2 (2016). 
In this case, Hawkins contends that the district court erred by denying appointed 
counsel’s original motion to withdraw.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.14-15.)  Hawkins does 
advance a brief argument in support of this claim, but he has failed to cite a single legal 
authority in support of his argument4 and he has not even identified, much less attempted 
to apply, the applicable standard of review.  (See id.)  Because Hawkins has failed to 
identify the applicable legal standards by which to evaluate the trial court’s decision to 
deny appointed counsel’s original motion to withdraw, he has waived consideration of the 
issue on appeal.  Kralovec, 161 Idaho at 575 n.2, 388 P.3d at 589 n.2; Cummings, 160 
Idaho at 853, 380 P.3d at 174; Murray, 156 Idaho at 168, 321 P.3d at 718. 
                                            
4 The only legal authority Hawkins cites in relation to the first issue he has raised on 
appeal is State v. Bias, 157 Idaho 895, 341 P.3d 1264 (Ct. App. 2014).  (Appellant’s 
brief, p.15.)  However, Hawkins cites Bias solely for the proposition that the district court 
was required to conduct a hearing on appointed counsel’s renewed motions to withdraw; 
he does not contend that Bias has any relevance to the district court’s decision to deny the 
original motion to withdraw following a hearing.  (See id., pp.14-16.) 
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2. Even If This Court Considers The Issue, Correct Application Of The Law To 
The Facts Shows The District Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion In 
Denying Appointed Counsel’s Original Motion To Withdraw 
 
After the district court granted Hawkins’ motion for the appointment of counsel, 
attorney Joseph Ellsworth filed a notice of appearance as Hawkins’ “Conflict Attorney of 
Record.”  (R., pp.113-14.)  A few months later, Mr. Ellsworth moved for leave to 
withdraw.  (R., pp.129-31.)  Following a hearing, at which both Mr. Ellsworth and 
Hawkins were permitted to argue in support of the motion for withdrawal, the district 
court denied the motion.  (R., p.135; see generally Tr.)  Contrary to Hawkins’ 
unsupported assertions on appeal, a review of the record and of the applicable law shows 
the court properly exercised its discretion. 
A post-conviction proceeding is civil in nature.  Unlike a criminal defendant, a 
post-conviction petitioner has no Sixth Amendment right to counsel or to self-
representation.  U.S. Const. amend. VI; Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987); 
Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (2014); see also Faretta v. California, 
422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975) (right to self-representation is implicitly guaranteed by Sixth 
Amendment).  Instead, the appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings is 
governed by I.C. § 19-4904.  That statute gives the court discretion to appoint counsel to 
assist an indigent petitioner “in the preparation of the [post-conviction] application, in the 
trial court, and on appeal.”  Once appointed, counsel may withdraw only upon obtaining 
leave of the court to do so:  
Except as otherwise provided in this Rule 11(b) and its subsections, or by 
stipulation and order of the court, no attorney may withdraw as an attorney 
of record for any party to an action without first obtaining leave and order 
of the court upon a motion filed with the court, and a hearing on the 
motion after notice to all parties to the action, including the client of the 
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withdrawing attorney.  Leave to withdraw as a counsel of record may be 
granted by the court for good cause and upon such conditions or sanctions 
as will prevent any delay in determination and disposition of the pending 
action and the rights of the parties.  … 
 
I.R.C.P. 11(b)(2) (2015) (emphasis added).  Pursuant to the plain language this rule, a 
court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to withdraw is discretionary, but such motion 
may only be granted upon a showing of “good cause.” 
In his motion to withdraw, Mr. Ellsworth represented that Hawkins had 
“expressed dissatisfaction with” Mr. Ellsworth’s representation and “desire[d] that 
counsel no longer represent” him, and that there had “developed a lack of cooperation” 
which “preclude[d] counsel from adequately representing” Hawkins.  (R., pp.129-31.)  At 
the hearing on the motion, Mr. Ellsworth assured the district court that he had 
“thoroughly investigated” Hawkins’ case and was “up to speed in terms of our 
investigation of what the legal issues are.”  (Tr., p.5, L.22 – p.6, L.6, p.11, L.23 – p.12, 
L.3.)  He explained, however, that he was constrained “by the rules of professional 
conduct in terms of what we can and cannot file” and that Hawkins was dissatisfied with 
his representation and no longer “wish[ed] to utilize the services of court appointed 
counsel.”  (Tr., p.6, Ls.7-18.)  Hawkins likewise requested that Mr. Ellsworth be 
permitted to withdraw, complaining about a lack of communication and the failure of Mr. 
Ellsworth to file documents on his behalf.  (Tr., p.15, L.2 – p.23, L.4.)  
After entertaining Mr. Ellsworth’s and Hawkins’ arguments on the motion, the 
district court exercised its discretion to deny it, finding, at least implicitly, that there was 
no showing of good cause.  Specifically, the court found that Hawkins’ failure to 
communicate with Mr. Ellsworth was not grounds for withdrawal and that both the court 
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and Hawkins – whose competency had been at issue in the underlying criminal 
proceedings – would benefit from Mr. Ellsworth’s continued appointment as counsel, 
particularly in light of the complexities of the underlying criminal case and the fact that 
Hawkins’ pro se petition was “incoherent.”  (Tr., p.7, L.18 – p.9, L.12, p.10, L.21 – p.12, 
L.23, p.13, L.24 – p.14, L.12, p.18, L.14 – p.19, L.18, p.21, L.3 – p.22, L.8, p.23, Ls.5-
21.)  The court also denied Hawkins’ oral requests for substitute counsel or, alternatively, 
self-representation, reasoning that Hawkins had no right to appointed counsel of his 
choice and again finding that Hawkins would benefit from Mr. Ellsworth’s assistance.  
(Tr., p.21, L.15 – p.22, L.8.)  Although Hawkins appears to contend otherwise, the district 
court’s decisions were consistent with applicable legal standards. 
 As noted above, post-conviction petitioners do not enjoy the same rights to 
counsel and self-representation that the Sixth Amendment affords to criminal defendants.  
However, even in criminal cases it is well-established that “[a]ppointed counsel may not 
withdraw merely because his client refuses to communicate with him.”  State v. Grant, 
154 Idaho 281, 285, 297 P.3d 244, 248 (2013).  It is likewise well-established that “[a]n 
indigent defendant has no right to select a particular appointed counsel.”  Id. (citing 
United States v. Gonzalez–Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 151 (2006); State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 
896, 897, 606 P.2d 1000, 1001 (1980)).  “Nor may a defendant manufacture such a right 
by refusing to communicate with his attorney.”  Id.  Because Hawkins had no right to an 
attorney at all, much less a right to an attorney of his choosing, the district court acted 
well within the bounds of its discretion in concluding that Mr. Ellsworth’s and Hawkins’ 
complaints regarding an inability or unwillingness to communicate with one another did 
not constitute good cause to permit Mr. Ellsworth to withdraw.  
 13 
 It is also clear that the court reached its decision to deny the motion by an exercise 
of reason.  At the outset of the hearing, the court expressed its concerns about allowing 
counsel to withdraw because Hawkins’ pro se petition was “pretty much incoherent” and 
because, in prior proceedings, some “very serious concerns were raised about [Hawkins’] 
competency.  (Tr., p.5, Ls.4-21.)  The court sympathized with Mr. Ellsworth’s position 
regarding the difficulties he was experiencing representing Hawkins and with Hawkins’ 
interest in fairly presenting all “legitimate issues” in his post-conviction petition.  (Tr., 
p.5, Ls.15-19, p.7, L.18 – p.8, L.21, p.10, L.21 – p.11, L.22, p.12, Ls.5-23, p.18, L.20 – 
p.19, L.1, p.19, Ls.12-18, p.21, Ls.3-14, p.22, Ls.1-8, p.23, Ls.5-20.)  Finding the alleged 
failure of communication between Mr. Ellsworth and Hawkins was not in itself a reason 
to grant the request for withdrawal, the court considered what effect allowing 
Mr. Ellsworth to withdraw would have on Hawkins’ interests and on the administration 
of the proceedings and, ultimately, concluded that both Hawkins and the court would 
benefit from Mr. Ellsworth’s continued representation.  (Id.)  Such determination was 
clearly within the court’s discretion, as the civil rule governing motions to withdraw 
specifically contemplated that the court consider whether permitting the withdrawal 
would cause “any delay in determination and disposition of the pending action and the 
rights of the parties.”  I.R.C.P. 11(b)(2) (2015).   
 Hawkins challenges the district court’s ruling, arguing that by not allowing 
 Mr. Ellsworth to withdraw, the court “place[d] appointed counsel in an untenable 
position where he had to review Mr. Hawkins’ filings and, if appropriate, file them, when 
those filings themselves contained Mr. Hawkins’ complaints against counsel.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p.14.)  According to Hawkins, “[w]hile it may very well have been 
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more convenient for the district court to have an attorney to deal with instead of 
Mr. Hawkins himself …, this cannot justify creating that sort of adversarial relationship 
between attorney and client.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.15.)  Hawkins’ claim that the court 
should have permitted Mr. Ellsworth to withdraw due to a conflict of interest fails both as 
a matter of law and under the facts of this case. 
 The right to conflict-free representation derives from the Sixth Amendment as 
applied to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Powell v. 
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1931).  The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant 
the right to counsel during all “critical stages” of the adversarial proceedings against him.  
Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 562, 149 P.3d 833, 837 (2006) (citations omitted).  
Although this right encompasses the first direct appeal, it does not extend to post-
conviction proceedings.  Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336-37 (2007); Pennsylvania 
v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987).  See also Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 394, 
327 P.3d 365, 370 (2014) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991)) 
(“‘[T]here is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction 
proceedings.’”); Hall v. State, 155 Idaho 610, 616, 315 P.3d 798, 804 (2013) (“[T]he 
right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings is not a constitutional right.” (internal 
quotations and citations omitted)).  
As the Idaho Supreme Court has explained, a post-conviction petition is a civil 
proceeding and so provides the clearest example of a proceeding to which the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, and the correlative right to conflict-free counsel, do not 
apply.  See Hall, 155 Idaho at 616, 315 P.3d at 804.  Nor does a post-conviction petitioner 
have a statutory right to counsel.  Murphy, 156 Idaho at 395, 327 P.3d at 371; Fields v. 
 15 
State, 135 Idaho 286, 291, 17 P.3d 230, 235 (2000).  Because Hawkins had no right to 
counsel, he had no right to conflict-free counsel to assist with his post-conviction petition.  
Hawkins’ unsupported assertions to the contrary are without merit.   
Even assuming, arguendo, that a post-conviction petitioner has the right to 
conflict-free counsel once counsel has actually been appointed, Hawkins has still failed to 
show an abuse of discretion because neither he nor Mr. Ellsworth alleged any actual 
conflict of interest in relation to counsel’s original motion to withdraw.  To demonstrate 
an actual conflict, a defendant or post-conviction petitioner must show: (1) that his 
counsel actively represented conflicting interests; and (2) that the conflict had an adverse 
effect.  Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980); Chippewa v. State, 156 Idaho 915, 
921, 332 P.3d 827, 833 (2014); State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 98, 967 P.2d 702, 712 
(1998).  Although it is clear from the record of the proceedings on Mr. Ellsworth’s 
original motion to withdraw that he and Hawkins disagreed about which claims were 
appropriate and could be ethically made, such was a personal disagreement between 
counsel and his client, not an actual conflict of interest as defined by case law.  Moreover, 
while Hawkins argues that one of his pro se “filings actually showed appointed counsel 
had been named in a lawsuit by Mr. Hawkins, creating a clear conflict”  (Appellant’s 
brief, p.14), a review of the record shows the “filing” to which Hawkins refers was never 
presented to the district court in relation to the original motion to withdraw.  (See R., 
pp.140-41, 188-225 (“Complaint” naming Mr. Ellsworth as a defendant attached to Mr. 
Ellsworth’s March 11, 2016 “Renewed Motion to Withdraw”).)  Even assuming Hawkins 
had a right to conflict-free post-conviction counsel, he cannot demonstrate the court 
abused its discretion by denying counsel’s original motion to withdraw based on an 
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alleged conflict that was never brought to its attention during the proceedings on that 
motion.5 
The record shows that the district court perceived the decision whether to permit 
Mr. Ellsworth to withdraw as discretionary, that it acted within the boundaries of its 
discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards, and that it reached its decision 
to deny the motion by an exercise of reason.  Hawkins’ arguments to the contrary are 
without merit and fail to show an abuse of discretion.  
 
D. Hawkins Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred By Not Conducting A 
Hearing Or Ruling On Counsel’s Renewed Motions To Withdraw That Were 
Never Noticed For Hearing 
 
After the district court denied Mr. Ellsworth’s original motion to withdraw, 
Mr. Ellsworth filed a “Notice of Lodging of Pleadings of Faron Hawkins and Renewed 
Motion to Withdraw” on March 11, 2016 (R., pp.140-42), an “Affidavit of Counsel In 
Support of Renewed Motion to Withdraw” on May 4, 2016 (R., pp.365-66), and “Another 
Motion to Withdraw” on October 31, 2016 (R., pp.639-40).  Hawkins argues that the 
district court erred by not conducting a hearing or ruling on any of Mr. Ellsworth’s
                                            
5 At the hearing on Mr. Ellsworth’s motion to withdraw, Hawkins did allege that, several 
years earlier, Mr. Ellsworth obtained documents from Hawkins and disclosed them to 
another individual “in violation of attorney-client” privilege.  (Tr., p.16, Ls.8-19.)  The 
district court inquired of Mr. Ellsworth whether he believed there was any conflict based 
on Hawkins’ representations, and Mr. Ellsworth responded, “No.”  (Tr., p.16, L.20 – 
p.17, L.1.)  On appeal, Hawkins does not cite this exchange as the basis of any alleged 
conflict of interest. 
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renewed motions to withdraw.6  (Appellant’s brief, pp.15-16.)  His argument is without 
merit, however, because Mr. Ellsworth never noticed the renewed motions for hearing.  
When Mr. Ellsworth filed his renewed motion to withdraw in March 2016, 
I.R.C.P. 11(b)(2) provided that “no attorney may withdraw as an attorney of record for 
any party to an action without first obtaining leave and order of the court upon a motion 
filed with the court, and a hearing on the motion after notice to all parties to the action.”  
I.R.C.P. 11(b)(2) (2015) (Emphasis added).  The amended rule, applicable to 
Mr. Ellsworth’s October 31, 2016 “Another Motion to Withdraw,” similarly provides that 
an “attorney seeking to withdraw must file a motion with the court and set the matter for 
hearing, and must provide notice to all parties.”  I.R.C.P. 11.3(b)(1) (eff. July 1, 2016).  
Although Mr. Ellsworth represented in his motions to withdraw that he was requesting a 
hearing, he never actually noticed the motions for hearing.  His failure to do so was 
contrary not only to his specific obligations under the rules governing requests for leave 
to withdraw, it was also contrary to the local rules of the Fourth Judicial District that 
require litigants to notice their motions for hearing.  See Idaho 4th Jud. Dist. Rule 2 
(“[O]nly those civil matters which have been scheduled for hearing by the clerks as 
provided by this rule and noticed for hearing pursuant to Rules 5(a) and 7(b), I.R.C.P. … 
will be heard by the court.”). 
                                            
6 Hawkins twice states in the argument section of his brief that, after the court denied 
Mr. Ellsworth’s original motion to withdraw, Mr. Ellsworth “filed another four motions 
to withdraw.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.14; see also p. 15 (“counsel moved to withdraw 
another four times”).)  This is incorrect.  As noted above, the record shows Mr. Ellsworth 
filed only two additional motions to withdraw, the first of which was supported (almost 
two months later) by an affidavit.  (R., pp.140-42, 365-66, 639-40.) 
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The Idaho Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in Bettwieser v. New York 
Irrigation Dist., 154 Idaho 317, 297 P.3d 1134 (2013).  On appeal from an adverse 
judgment following a bench trial in a breach of contract action, Bettwieser argued that 
“the district court erred by failing to rule on all of his pre-trial motions.”  Id. at 327, 
297 P.3d at 1144.  The Idaho Supreme Court rejected Bettwieser’s argument because the 
record showed Bettwieser, a pro se litigant, never noticed the pretrial motions for hearing.  
Id.  The Court reasoned: 
Attorneys are expected to know the rules of the forum, and pro se litigants 
are not afforded a more lenient standard.  Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 
224, 229, 220 P.3d 580, 585 (2009).  As explained above, the Rules of 
Civil Procedure permit a district court to set a party’s motion for hearing 
sua sponte.  I.R.C.P. 6(e)(2).  However, we also explained that under the 
local rules of the Fourth Judicial District, parties are required to schedule 
motion hearings with the clerk of the presiding judge and “only those civil 
matters which have been scheduled for hearing by the clerks as provided 
by this rule and noticed for hearing pursuant to Rules 5(a) and 7(b), 
I.R.C.P., will be heard by the court.”  Idaho 4th Jud. Dist. Rule 2. 
 
 Here, the district court reminded Bettwieser on more than one 
occasion that he must schedule a hearing before the court would rule on a 
motion.  Bettwieser has not identified any instance where the district court 
failed to address and rule on any motion that Bettwieser had properly 
scheduled and noticed for hearing.  The district court did not err in 
declining to rule on motions that Bettwieser failed to notice for hearing. 
 
Bettwieser, 154 Idaho at 327, 297 P.3d at 1144. 
 The reasoning and result of Bettwieser are controlling in this case.  As an attorney, 
Mr. Ellsworth was expected to know the rules of the forum in which he filed his motions 
to withdraw.  Id. (citation omitted).  That forum was the Fourth Judicial District, where 
the local rules require parties in civil matters to schedule motion hearings with the clerk 
of the presiding judge.  Idaho 4th Jud. Dist. Rule 2; Bettwieser, 154 Idaho at 327, 
297 P.3d at 1144.  It appears Mr. Ellsworth was actually aware of this obligation, as his 
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original motion to withdraw, filed in September 2015, sat dormant until Mr. Ellsworth 
filed a notice of hearing in January 2016, after which the district court conducted the 
requested hearing and ruled on the motion.  (R., pp.129-31, 133-35; Tr., generally.)  If 
Mr. Ellsworth desired a hearing on his renewed motions to withdraw, it was his 
obligation to schedule it.  Idaho 4th Jud. Dist. Rule 2; Bettwieser, 154 Idaho at 327, 
297 P.3d at 1144.  Because he failed to do so, Hawkins cannot show that the district court 
erred by not conducting a hearing or ruling on those motions.  Bettwieser, 154 Idaho at 
327, 297 P.3d at 1144. 
 On appeal, Hawkins does not address the procedural rules that required 
Mr. Ellsworth to notice his renewed motions to withdraw for hearing.  Instead, relying on  
State v. Bias, 157 Idaho 895, 341 P.3d 1264 (Ct. App. 2014), Hawkins contends the 
district court had a duty to sua sponte hold a hearing on the renewed motions because the 
motions, and some of the attached pro se pleadings, alleged a conflict of interest.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.15-16.)  Contrary to Hawkins’ assertions, however, neither Bias, 
nor Rios-Lopez v. State, 144 Idaho 340, 342, 160 P.3d 1275, 1277 (Ct. App. 2007) – the 
case cited in the portion of the Bias opinion on which Hawkins relies – stand for the 
proposition that a district court has a duty to conduct a hearing whenever a post-
conviction petitioner or his appointed counsel allege a potential conflict of interest.  To 
the contrary, Bias held only that a criminal defendant requesting substitute counsel based 
on an alleged conflict of interest has a “right to an inquiry” stemming from “several 
interrelated constitutional guarantees,” including the Sixth Amendment right to the 
effective assistance counsel and “constitutional right to refuse counsel and proceed pro 
se.”  Although the Bias Court cited Rios-Lopez for the general proposition that “some 
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inquiry may be guaranteed by procedural due process,”  see id., the Rios-Lopez opinion 
itself makes clear that the procedures required to rule on a request for substitute counsel 
made by a criminal defendant with a Sixth Amendment right to counsel do not apply in 
post-conviction proceedings and that holding a hearing is not “the only permissible 
method for the district court to afford a full and fair opportunity for a litigant to present 
the motion,” Rios-Lopez, 144 Idaho at 343-344, 160 P.3d at 1278-1279.   
In this case, Mr. Ellsworth had a full and fair opportunity to present his renewed 
motions to withdraw.  He filed his motions with the court and, in each case, presented the 
facts and reasons underlying his requests in the body of the motions and in an affidavit.  
(R., pp.140-42, 365-66, 639-40.)  He also attached to his motions Hawkins’ pro se 
pleadings.  (R., pp.143-225.)  That Mr. Ellsworth did not avail himself of the procedures 
necessary to obtain a hearing on his motions does not show any error by the district court.  
The district court had no free-standing duty to inquire into any alleged conflict of interest, 
and Hawkins has failed to demonstrate that the court violated his right to procedural due 
process by not conducting a hearing that was available to Mr. Ellsworth under established 
procedural rules but which Mr. Ellsworth never requested.  Hawkins has failed to show 
any basis for reversal. 
 
II. 
Hawkins Has Failed To Show The District Court Committed Reversible Error By 
Summarily Dismissing His Post-Conviction Petition Without First Taking Judicial Notice 
Of The Record Of The Underlying Criminal Proceedings 
 
A. Introduction 
 Hawkins asks this Court to reverse the district court’s order of summary dismissal 
because the court’s “notice of intent to dismiss contained 14 pages detailing the procedure 
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of the criminal case,” but the court never took judicial notice of the underlying criminal 
record and therefore, according to Hawkins, “there was actually no record upon which the 
district court could base its dismissal.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.16-17.)  Hawkins’ 
argument that this Court must reverse the order of summary dismissal based solely on the 
court’s failure to have taken judicial notice of the proceedings it “detailed” in the 
“Procedural Background” section of its notice of intent to dismiss fails because Hawkins 
has failed to even argue, much less demonstrate, that the error he alleges actually resulted 
in the erroneous dismissal of the claims in the petition. 
 
B. Hawkins Has Not Argued, Much Less Demonstrated, How The District Court 
Erred With Respect To Its Analysis Of Each And Every Claim In The Petition 
And, As Such, Has Waived His Claim That The Order Of Summary Dismissal 
Should Be Reversed In Its Entirety 
 
It is a well settled tenet of appellate review that the “party alleging error has the 
burden of showing it in the record.”  Akers v. D.L. White Const., Inc., 156 Idaho 37, 
320 P.3d 428 (2014).  It is equally well settled that the appellate court will not review 
actions of the district court for which no error has been assigned and will not otherwise 
search the record for unspecified errors.  State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 159, 657 
P.2d 17, 23 (1983).  Moreover, “[a] party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or 
argument are lacking.”  State v. Freitas, 157 Idaho 257, 267, 335 P.3d 597, 607 (Ct. App. 
2014) (citing State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996)). 
Hawkins argues that because the district court did not take judicial notice of the 
underlying criminal proceedings it “detailed” in the “Procedural Background” section of 
its notice of intent to dismiss, the order of summary dismissal that was based on that 
notice must be reversed in its entirety.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.16-17.)  Hawkins does not 
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even attempt to demonstrate that the error he alleges actually resulted in the erroneous 
dismissal of the claims in his petition.  Instead, he asserts in conclusory fashion that 
“since the district court failed to take judicial notice of the criminal case proceedings and 
the entire record (or even more than a fraction of it) was not otherwise made part of the 
post-conviction, there was actually no record upon which the district court could base its 
dismissal.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.17.)  There are at least three reasons why this generic 
argument is insufficient to adequately present for appellate review the claim that the 
district court erred in summarily dismissing every claim in the post-conviction petition. 
First, Hawkins has failed to support his argument with any legal authority 
standing for the proposition that a district court must take judicial notice of the underlying 
criminal proceedings before dismissing a post-conviction petition.  Hawkins does cite 
Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 648, 873 P.2d 898, 902 (Ct. App. 1994), for the 
proposition that “[n]o part of the record from the criminal case becomes part of the record 
in the post-conviction proceeding unless it is entered as a[n] exhibit.”  (Appellant’s brief, 
p.17.)  Roman, however, in no way supports Hawkins’ argument that the district court 
could not summarily dismiss the claims in his petition without first taking judicial notice 
of the underlying criminal proceedings.  In fact, as explained in greater detail below, 
Roman makes clear that, to avoid summary dismissal, it was Hawkins’ burden to allege 
facts and present admissible evidence to make a prima facie showing that he was entitled 
to relief on each of his post-conviction claims.  Id.; see also I.C. §§ 19-4903, -4906.  
Because Hawkins has failed to cite any legal authority supporting his claim for a 
wholesale reversal of the district court’s summary dismissal order, the issue is waived.  
Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d at 970. 
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Second, Hawkins has failed to assign error to any specific ruling of the district 
court.  Having asserted that the order of summary dismissal should be reversed in its 
entirety based on the failure of the district to have taken judicial notice of the underlying 
criminal proceedings, it is Hawkins’ burden to demonstrate from the record that the 
alleged error actually resulted in the erroneous dismissal of every claim in the petition.   
Akers, 156 Idaho 37, 320 P.3d 428 (appellant’s burden to show error).  Because Hawkins 
has not even attempted to carry this burden, he has failed to adequately present the issue 
for appellate review. 
Finally, even assuming the truth of Hawkins’ appellate argument that the district 
court erred by not taking judicial notice of the underlying criminal proceedings it 
discussed in the “Procedural Background” section of its notice of intent to dismiss, 
Hawkins has still failed to show any basis for reversal.  On review of an order summarily 
dismissing a post-conviction petition, the appellate court reviews the record to determine 
whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, which, if resolved in the applicant’s favor, 
would entitle the applicant to the requested relief, Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 
839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); and whether a genuine issue of material fact exists is subject 
to free review, Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 
(Ct. App. 1986).  Because this Court freely reviews whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists, it is irrelevant whether the district court took judicial notice of the underlying 
criminal proceedings unless its failure to do so actually resulted in the erroneous 
dismissal of the claims in the petition.  Thus, it is Hawkins’ burden to demonstrate, on a 
claim-by-claim basis, why the error he alleges requires reversal of the order of summary 
dismissal in its entirety.  Hoisington, 104 Idaho at 159, 657 P.2d at 23 (appellate court 
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will not search record for unspecified error).  Having failed to even attempt to make such 
a showing, Hawkins has failed to adequately present his claim of error for appellate 
review. 
Even if this Court reaches the merits of Hawkins’ argument, it fails.  It is beyond 
well-established that, to avoid summary dismissal, a post-conviction petitioner must 
present admissible evidence making out a prima facie case as to each essential element of 
the claims upon which the petitioner bears the burden of proof.  E.g., Adams v. State, 
158 Idaho 530, 537, 348 P.3d 145, 152 (2015); DeRushé v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603, 
200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009); Allreno v. State, 158 Idaho 708, 710, 351 P.3d 636, 638 (Ct. 
App. 2015); Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901.  A review of the record in this 
case shows the district court dismissed the claims in Hawkins’ petition, not based on any 
facts derived from the underlying criminal record, but based on Hawkins’ failures to 
support his claims with any admissible evidence making out a prima facie claim for 
relief.7  (See, generally, R., pp.630-37.)  Because the record shows the court’s oversight 
in not taking judicial notice of the facts it discussed in the “Procedural Background” 
section of its notice of intent to dismiss did not actually affect its analyses of Hawkins’ 
claims, and because Hawkins does not contend he actually carried his burden of making 
out a prima facie case with respect to each claim in his petition, Hawkins has failed to 
show any basis for reversal. 
 
                                            
7 To the extent the court did recite facts in its analyses of Hawkins’ claims, those facts are 
readily ascertainable from the published opinions issued in Hawkins’ prior appeals and 
upon which Hawkins appears to acknowledge the district court could rely.  (Appellant’s 




 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and the district 
court’s order denying appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw. 
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